Mallon v. R. – TCC: Taxpayer salesman for internet seminar/webinar company an employee, not an independent contractor

Bill Innes on Current Tax Cases

http://decision.tcc-cci.gc.ca/site/tcc-cci/decisions/en/item/66400/index.do New Window

Mallon v. M.N.R.[1] (January 14, 2014) deal with whether a commission salesman for an internet seminar/webinar company was an employee or an independent contractor for EI and CPP purposes:

[2]             I heard two witnesses: Mr. Mallon and the CEO of Honeycomb, Mr. John Hughes. Unlike many cases dealing with this issue, here, Mr. Hughes, representing the Payor and Mr. Mallon, the independent contractor or employee, told the same story. Their description of the work, of the arrangement and the contract was identical. This was indeed refreshing.

[3]             Honeycomb is in the digital media events business. It provides internet seminars or webinars in the biotech industry. To be successful the business needs both an audience and sponsors. It was Mr. Mallon’s job to find sponsors, who would pay Honeycomb to sponsor a webinar and thus get its business in front of potential biotech customers.

[4]             Mr. Mallon, prior to joining Honeycomb, was employed at the Toronto Board of Trade, but as his arrangement was coming to an end, he responded to a Craig’s List advertisement regarding a position with Honeycomb. Honeycomb needed someone to create new business, and after some meetings between Mr. Hughes and Mr. Mallon, in which Mr. Mallon expressed a desire to be an independent contractor, an agreement, the Contracting Services Agreement, was reached. According to Mr. Mallon, he used the Board of Trade’s contract, with some minor modifications, in his new position.

[5]             Mr. Mallon’s job was to sell sponsorships. In 2011, only he and Mr. Hughes were handling that aspect of the business. Since then, others have been hired who also do sales, all but one of whom is in an employment arrangement. The other individual who started as an independent contractor changed to employee status when this became an issue with the Government. Only Mr. Mallon has pursued this issue.

While the agreement between Mr. Mallon and Honeycomb expressed the intention that he be treated as an independent contractor, the court held this was not determinative:

[14]        So, stated intention can be “disregarded”: “legal status of independent contractor or of employee is not determined solely on the basis of the parties declaration as to their intent”. With respect, turning what was, prior to the Royal Winnipeg Ballet case, a one-step approach into a two-step approach, requiring the second step to be an analysis through the “prism” of intention appears to place too great an emphasis on the factor of intention, that can so readily be manipulated with no regard for the true status of the working relationship, but more to the effect of avoiding source deductions. I am bound to follow the Federal Court of Appeal’s approach, and I will, as clearly in this case the actions of Mr. Mallon (no invoices, no business expenses, no GST) and the actions of Honeycomb (treating all other workers in similar positions as employees) do not support an intention expressed by words only in the Contracting Services Agreement that an independent contractor relationship was intended. It is unnecessary therefore to enter the second step of the analysis suggested by the Federal Court of Appeal through an independent contractor prism. What is necessary is to review those traditional factors to answer the simple question – whose business is it?

[15]         I would suggest, with respect, the two step approach is backwards. First, determine the true nature of the working arrangement, through the traditional analysis, and as Justice Noel acknowledged in Wolf v The Queen, if the answer is not definitive, consider the mutual intention. Or perhaps look to intention as just one of the traditional factors such as control, ownership of tools, chance of profit and risk of loss, limiting the analysis to one step. It has always troubled me that this factor received no mention in the Supreme Court of Canada leading case on this issue (1671122 Ontario Ltd. v Sagaz Industries Canada Inc.,) yet we now must analyze through the intention prism. As judges we attempt to set tests not just to provide useful guidance for our own analysis, but to provide a helpful roadmap to taxpayers or, in this case, employers and workers. When determining the status of a working arrangement the message must be that the courts will look foremost to the actions and behaviour that define the relationship and determine whose business it is. Indeed, action and behaviour will determine intention, not the other way round. Mr. Mallon’s intention to be an independent contractor meant, to him, an ability to terminate the contract with little notice. Clearly this is not a differentiating factor in the analysis and weakens any value to be put on stated intention. I proceed with caution when factoring intention into the analysis.

[16]        I find in this case there is only one business and that is the business of Honeycomb. Mr. Mallon is not in business on his own account.  …

[Footnotes omitted]

The court reviewed the relevant facts of control, ownership of equipment, chance of profit, risk of loss and other relevant factors and determined that Mr. Mallon was an employee.  As a result the appeal was dismissed.

[1] 2014 TCC 14.